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 Governmentality, Biopower, and the Debate 
over Genetic Enhancement 
 LADELLE  McWHORTER  
 University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, USA 
 Although Foucault adamantly refused to make moral pronounce-
ments or dictate moral principles or political programs to his read-
ers, his work offers a number of tools and concepts that can help us 
develop our own ethical views and practices. One of these tools is 
genealogical analysis, and one of these concepts is  “ biopower. ” Spe-
cifi cally, this essay seeks to demonstrate that Foucault’s concept of 
biopower and his genealogical method are valuable as we consider 
moral questions raised by genetic enhancement technologies. First, 
it examines contemporary debate over the development, marketing, 
and application of such technologies, suggesting that what passes 
for ethical deliberation is often little more than political maneuver-
ing in a fi eld where stakes are very high and public perceptions will 
play a crucial role in decisions about which technologies will be 
funded or disallowed. It goes on to argue that genuine ethical de-
liberation on these issues requires some serious investigation of 
their historical context. Accordingly, then, it takes up the oft-heard 
charge from critics that genetic enhancement technologies are 
continuous with twentieth-century eugenic projects or will usher in 
a new age of eugenics. Foucault explicitly links twentieth-century 
eugenics with the rise of biopower. Through review of some aspects 
of the twentieth-century eugenics movement alongside some of the 
rhetoric and claims of enhancement’s modern-day proponents, the 
essay shows ways in which deployment of genetic enhancement 
technologies is and is not continuous with earlier deployments of 
biopower. 
 Keywords:  biopower ,  eugenics ,  Foucault ,  genetic enhancement , 
 governmentality 
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 I .  INTRODUCTION 
 Michel Foucault made no claims about the moral rightness or wrongness of 
altering human genomes or the human gene pool, but that silence does not 
bespeak a lack of knowledge of or interest in the science of genetics or its ap-
plications. Through his research for  Birth of the Clinic and  The Order of Things , 
Foucault was well versed in the history of both medicine and biology. As part 
of his candidacy presentation for his position at the Collège de France, he 
proposed a course on the knowledge of heredity in the nineteenth century 
 “ starting from breeding techniques, on through attempts to improve species, 
experiments with intensive cultivation, efforts to combat animal and plant epi-
demics, and culminating in the establishment of a genetics whose birth date 
can be placed at the beginning of the twentieth century ” ( Foucault, 1997b , 7). 
As the course description goes on to make clear, what captured Foucault’s 
interest was this early knowledge’s rise to epistemic credibility, its ascent to-
ward the status of truth, not its ethical entanglements and implications. But he 
cannot have been oblivious to them, especially as he turned his attention over 
the next 8 or 9 years to disciplinary normalization and then to sexuality and 
biopower. His reticence was not a product of ignorance or neglect but of his 
own ethical principles. Foucault repeatedly refused to set an ethical agenda for 
anyone but himself.  “ People have to build their own ethics, ” he declared 
( Foucault, 1997a , 132). Intellectuals and experts may provide information and 
analyses that serve as resources or  “ toolkits ” for that project, but ultimately 
people have to exercise their freedom in the creation of their own  ethoi . 
 It might seem odd, then, to examine the current debate over the morality of 
genetic enhancement from a Foucaultian perspective. Certainly any attempt to 
enter the discussion using Foucault’s work as a foundation for making moral 
claims would be futile. But that is not the aim here. Instead, I intend to show, 
fi rst, that what passes for ethical deliberation in the philosophical, bioethical, 
and scientifi c literature is for the most part not that; it is, rather, a verbal political 
struggle among sets of people, most of whom have already made up their 
minds on the ethical issues, who are attempting to position themselves to infl u-
ence governmental decisions about scientifi c and medical practices. Second, I 
will use some of the genealogical tools that Foucault developed in his work on 
sexuality, biopower, and governmentality to situate this political struggle in a 
larger historical and political context, which I hope, in keeping with the spirit 
of Foucault’s work, may be of some service in projects of ethical creativity. 
 II .  FIRST, THE POLITICS OF DEBATE 
 The debate over genetic enhancement purports to be a deliberation about 
whether one should act in certain ways, such as (1) support (or, in the case 
of scientists, engage in) genetic research leading to the development of 
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enhancement technology (and if one is a clinician whether one should then 
facilitate its application), (2) vote for candidates for public offi ce who would 
in turn vote for government funding for such research and technological 
development or at least refuse to ban it, and, perhaps, (3) offer oneself or 
one’s progeny as test subjects. However,  deliberation implies consideration 
of others ’ views, feelings, and worries, something notably missing from most 
writing on this subject. Instead of attempting to understand their interlocu-
tors ’ concerns, parties to the debate typically engage those with varying 
perspectives not as partners in deliberation but as adversaries to be coun-
tered or, even, as oppressors to be denounced and resisted. 
 “ What I fail to understand is how other people — or the federal 
 government — could think it is just to prevent me from benefi ting my future 
children, ” says University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Medicine 
professor Gregory Pence.  “ I see no difference between such a ban and a 
similar ban on parents sending their children to computer camps in the sum-
mer: both are intended to better children, both will be done most by people 
with money, and both are not the business of government ” ( Stock and 
 Campbell, 2000 , 113). Government interference with parental decisions to 
alter their embryos ’ genomes is a form of tyranny, Pence implies, and people 
who want the government to ban enhancement are would-be tyrants. Pence 
is not the only proponent of enhancement to see the situation that way. Bio-
ethicist John Harris asserts that  “ the key idea of reproductive liberty is surely 
respect for autonomy and for the values which underlie the importance at-
tached to procreation. These values see procreation and founding a family 
as involving the freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle and express, through 
actions as well as through words, the deeply held beliefs and the morality 
which families share and seek to pass on to future generations ” ( Harris, 
2007 , 76). Unless we can demonstrate that great harm will result from par-
ents opting to have their embryos genetically enhanced, Harris maintains, 
we cannot legitimately prevent their doing so. He insists, further, that all 
predictions of great harm are faulty or false. Therefore, those who seek to 
prohibit genetic enhancement pose a serious threat to political liberty. 
 The right to privacy in reproductive and family matters is not the only 
principle at stake, according to many advocates of enhancement; the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom is also in jeopardy. Many dis-
miss their opponents ’ ethical arguments out of hand with the claim that their 
views are based (ultimately if not always obviously) on religious belief — in 
other words that, in violation of the Constitution, opponents of genetic en-
hancement seek to impose their religion the rest of us. 1 Geneticist James 
Watson, codiscoverer of DNA’s double helical structure and cofounder of the 
Human Genome Project, asserts that, if we can safely enhance people’s intel-
ligence,  “ we’ve got to go ahead and not worry whether we’re going to offend 
some fundamentalist from Tulsa, Oklahoma ” ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 80), 
presumably a reference to televangelist Oral Roberts and, by extension, the 
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right-wing political forces that have opposed abortion,  in vitro fertilization, 
stem cell research, and numerous other medical and biological initiatives on 
religious grounds. Similarly, University of Connecticut School of Medicine 
professor James Hughes condemns opposition to genetic enhancement as 
nothing but  “ Luddite mysticism, ” by which he seems to mean a combination 
of irrational fear of technology and improper importation of religious tenets 
into the secular political realm ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 130). Whenever 
metaphysically inspired legal limits are placed on biological research and 
technological application, these and many other scientists and medical prac-
titioners believe that injustice is being done. Their writings are attempts to 
expose that injustice and counter it — a project that leaves little room for seri-
ously entertaining the concerns their opponents express. 
 Proponents of the freedom to enhance are not the only ones making 
charges of injustice, however. Many opponents of genetic engineering 
express fear that enhancement amounts to a resurgence of eugenics, a 
 twentieth-century political movement that resulted in the incarceration and 
forced sterilization of tens of thousands of Americans, most of whom were 
poor and many of whom were recent immigrants or members of racial or 
ethnic minorities. In an article entitled  “ State-sponsored liberal eugenics has 
just begun, ” for example, C. Ben Mitchell and C. Christopher Hook (fellows 
of the Institute of Biotechnology and the Human Future) warn that  “ so-called 
enhancement is merely a desire to re-engineer the human person ” ( Mitchell 
and Hook, 2006 ), an assertion reinforced by proclamations from avowed 
eugenicists such as Glayde Whitney (whose work is underwritten by the 
infamous Pioneer Fund founded by twentieth-century scientifi c racist Wickliffe 
Draper 2 ):  “ The fi rst century or two of the new millennium will almost cer-
tainly be a golden age for eugenics. Through application of new genetic 
knowledge and reproductive technologies the Galtonian Revolution will 
come to fruition ” ( Whitney, 1999 , 179). Appalled by such prospects,  Mitchell 
and Hook (2006) go on to ask,  “ Have we learned none of the lessons of the 
older eugenic age?  … How many will have to die in human re-design experi-
ments  … ? Moreover, through genetic enhancement, we will inevitably create 
at least two genetic classes of people: the gene-enhanced and the rest of us. 
We have not even fi gured out how to solve access to healthcare for thera-
peutic and preventive goals. Injustice already abounds in our society. How 
do we hope even to begin a discussion about equal access to genetic modi-
fi cation for enhancement purposes? ” . In an essay entitled  “ Is a New Eugenics 
Afoot? ” historian of science Allen Garland voices similar concerns:
 The early 20 th -century eugenics movement was a product of a particular economic, 
social, and scientifi c context: a highly transitional period in American economic 
and industrial expansion, the advent of a new genetic paradigm, and the ideology 
of rational management by scientifi cally trained experts. As historian Sheila Weiss 
has emphasized, there was enough logic to the eugenic argument — saving the 
hard-pressed taxpayer the burden of supporting masses of supposedly defective 
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people — to give it popular appeal. For a segment of the biological community, 
it provided career opportunities that could be justifi ed as the application of their 
science directly to the solution of social problems. For the wealthy benefactors 
that supported eugenics, such as the Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, and Kellogg 
philanthropies, eugenics provided a means of social control in a period of unprec-
edented upheaval and violence. [ … ] 
 I would argue that we are poised at the threshold of a similar period in our own 
history and are adopting a similar mind frame as our predecessors. [ … ] 
 We seem to be increasingly unwilling to accept what we view as imperfection in 
ourselves and others. As health care costs skyrocket, we are coming to accept a 
bottom-line, cost-benefi t analysis of human life. This mindset has serious implica-
tions for reproductive decisions. [ … ] If eugenics means making reproductive deci-
sions primarily on the basis of social cost, then we are well on that road ( Garland, 
2001 , 61). 
For many opponents of genetic enhancement, this discussion is not so 
much a moral deliberation as a political struggle against forces that they be-
lieve would compound economic inequality and oppression. 
 Regardless of which side one takes on these issues, it is clear that much is 
at stake — professional careers, billions of dollars in funding for research and 
potential profi ts, and millions of human (and not only human) lives. Per-
haps, for many people something even more precious is at stake as well: 
their dreams, their visions, and their worldviews. Most participants in the 
debate seem to believe that something very crucial is about to be decided, 
something that once decided cannot be reversed, something far more than a 
course of research or a set of public policies, and something that will trans-
form all of us, genetically or not. That may be one reason why there is a 
distinct streak of nastiness running through this literature, why it includes so 
many personal attacks 3 and denunciations, so much name-calling and incre-
dulity in the face of others ’ concerns. This debate is a highly sensitive nodal 
point in an event that Foucault might call an emerging problematization. The 
issues it encompasses are likely to become more rather than less pressing in 
the near future, impinging upon our lives in a variety of ways. Thus, the 
controversy over genetic enhancement technologies demands some careful 
attention. 
 III .  BUT IS IT REALLY EUGENICS? 
 Foucault often began his analyses of problematizations at the points within 
discourses where tensions seem to concentrate. One of those points in the 
enhancement controversy is the oft-repeated allegation that genetic enhance-
ment amounts to or will usher in a new eugenics movement, a development 
that most parties to this discussion take to be undeniably bad or even horrifi c. 
Proponents of enhancement work hard to distinguish it from eugenics and to 
establish a stark moral contrast between the twentieth-century movement and 
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genetic technologies in the present day. Gregory Pence, for example, says 
he simply supports allowing parents as wide a range of reproductive choices 
as technologically possible.  “ This is not state-controlled eugenics (which at-
tempted to take away such choices from parents), but its opposite, ” he in-
sists.  “ If a child can be given an extra decade of life by an artifi cial chromosome, 
or 50 percent more memory through a therapy in utero, then I personally 
would feel  obligated to give my future child such benefi ts ” ( Stock and 
 Campbell, 2000 , 113). 
 Although Pence’s sense of obligation is not widely shared, his strategy for 
differentiating his view from eugenics is. In a survey of British professionals, 
 Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Amos (1998) found fi ve strategies, which they 
refer to as  “ rhetorical boundaries, ” that genetic researchers and clinicians use 
to distinguish their practices from eugenics: (1) Eugenics was pseudosci-
ence. (2) The kinds of eugenic human engineering that lay people fear are 
not technically feasible or realistic; scientists cannot really design and pro-
duce people from scratch. (3) Eugenics involved coercive reproductive poli-
cies in totalitarian regimes, whereas contemporary selection decisions are 
made by private individuals and families. (4) Even in the eugenic past, ge-
neticists were not at fault; their work was simply appropriated and abused 
by eugenicists. And (5) eugenic policies of the past focused on altering the 
human gene pool or some nationally or racially defi ned subset thereof, 
whereas the focus of human genetics now is on addressing individuals ’ con-
ditions. Although those interviewed in the Kerr study were not necessarily 
advocates for genetic alteration beyond therapeutic intervention, variations 
on the rhetorical strategies they use recur in the enhancement literature. 4 
Enhancement advocates typically emphasize individual freedom of choice as 
opposed to state coercion and the absence of nationalistic or racist goals as 
the impetus for germ-line improvement. Genetic enhancement is not eugen-
ics, most advocates claim, as long as alteration is voluntary and the aim is 
not the creation of a master race. Eugenics is not part of genetic enhance-
ment’s agenda or genealogy. 
 Critics are not pacifi ed by these assertions. They counter that such argu-
ments misrepresent either the twentieth-century eugenics movement or the 
twenty-fi rst-century technological and political situation, or both; the two are 
not nearly as dissimilar as proponents of enhancement would have us think. 
In fact, many twentieth-century advocates of eugenics were practicing scien-
tists, and some (including Joshua Lederberg, Francis Crick, Edward Tatum, 
and Theodosius Dobzhansky 5 ) were practicing geneticists. Eugenics and ge-
netics overlapped signifi cantly from the 1910s well into the 1930s and to 
some extent even into the 1950s and 1960s; it is simply false to dismiss eu-
genics as a pseudoscientifi c movement. Furthermore, the aims of eugenic 
policies and programs were multiple and included relieving suffering and 
reducing taxes; they were not exclusively focused on racist ascendency. Eu-
genics was widely accepted and implemented not only in totalitarian states 
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such as Nazi Germany but also in liberal democracies such as the United 
States and Great Britain. Nor is it the case, as Kerr et al. (1998, 193 ) point out, 
that twenty-fi rst-century genetics practitioners focus exclusively on alteration 
of the individual rather than of the human gene pool and the course of 
human evolution. 
 It is true that race plays a much smaller role in this new technological 
movement than it did in the old eugenics movement. In the past, there were 
some prominent groups that called for extermination of entire races of peo-
ple. But it is not true that the old movement was all about race. In fact, its 
central focus was not races but rather classes of people whose physical or 
behavioral characteristics made them  “ unfi t ” for modern life or  “ socially in-
adequate. ” Extremists wanted to bring about extermination of these people’s 
germ lines through  “ euthanasia, ” 6 but the vast majority of eugenics ’ adher-
ents favored nonlethal means. In 1922, Cold Spring Harbor’s Eugenics Re-
cord Offi ce director Harry Laughlin drafted a Model Eugenical Sterilization 
Law — “ an act to prevent the procreation of persons socially inadequate from 
defective inheritance ” — wherein a  “ socially inadequate person ” was defi ned 
as  “ one who by his or her own effort, regardless of etiology or prognosis, 
fails chronically in comparison to normal persons, to maintain himself or 
herself as a useful member of the organized social life of the state. ” Socially 
inadequate classes of people included:
 (1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane, (including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (includ-
ing the delinquent and wayward); (4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including drug- habitués); 
(6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous, and others with 
chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases); (7) Blind (including those with 
seriously impaired vision); (8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired hear-
ing); (9) Deformed (including the crippled); and (10) Dependent (including  orphans, 
ne’er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps and paupers) ( Laughlin, 1922 , 446 – 7). 
Nowhere does the model law mention race. But it is worth noting that in 
the aftermath of military IQ testing during World War I, it was commonly 
held that close to 90% of African Americans were feeble minded, and pub-
lished studies of immigrants tested at Ellis Island suggested that the majority 
of Southern and Eastern Europeans were moronic if not imbecilic. Also of 
note is the fact that homosexuality in both men and women was offi cially 
defi ned as a form of psychopathic delusion. If completely enacted and en-
forced, therefore, Laughlin’s model law would have sterilized all lesbians, 
gay men, and bisexuals (a measure which may or may not have had any ef-
fect on the number of homosexuals in subsequent generations) and would 
have eliminated most of the African American population within a few de-
cades, along with many of the newer American immigrant groups such as 
Italians, Russians, Poles, and Croatians who were thought to suffer dispro-
portionately not only from feeblemindedness but also from alcoholism and 
insanity. Laughlin’s model served as a guide for the men who drafted state 
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sterilization laws in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as those who designed the 
eugenic sterilization program in Nazi Germany. 7 Despite the absence of ra-
cial categories in the law, there is no question that heterosexism, racism, 
anti-Semitism, and a generalized xenophobia and ethnocentrism permeated 
much of the old eugenics movement. 
 Still, even if application and enforcement of this and similar laws and poli-
cies were racist, ethnocentric, and homophobic, the arguments advanced to 
justify eugenic sterilization and other reproductive restrictions were seldom 
so. As already noted, proponents emphasized the economic savings that 
reduction in  “ dependent ” populations would bring, a major selling point for 
legislators and taxpayers. And they argued for the evolutionary importance 
of offsetting the humane but unnatural consequences of modern medicine, 
which enabled people who otherwise would have died of their genetic 
weaknesses to live beyond puberty.  “ Until medical science improved social, 
public health and sanitary conditions, nature’s survival of the fi ttest defended 
the human race against the dangers of degeneracy, ” declared William Part-
low, superintendent of Alabama’s state home for the mentally retarded, in 
1936; however, now that  “ the weak are preserved as well as the strong, if 
we are to continue as a virile, upstanding race in body and mind, eugenics 
 demands its share of study and attention  … ” ( Partlow, 1936 , 12). By mid- 
century, American Eugenics Society president Frederick Osborn warned that 
a 97% rate of survival to the thirtieth year, which allowed almost everyone to 
live long enough to reproduce, could have devastating consequences.  “ This 
is more than relaxed selection, ” he emphasized.  “ It represents a drastic di-
minishing in the rate of natural selection, tragic because it points to an in-
crease in the proportion of people born to much suffering ” ( Osborn, 1968 , 
70). The only way to prevent devolution was eugenics. 
 But to characterize twentieth-century eugenics as nothing more than a 
means of heading off economic and biological disaster is to do a great injus-
tice to its proponents ’ vision. Once free of responsibility to provide for peo-
ple unable to provide for themselves, the healthier and more intelligent 
members of the species would have more children. As a result, the standard 
measure of normality would be revised upward. If the bottom 10% of each 
generation were sterilized or otherwise prevented from procreating — as of-
fi cials such as Harry Laughlin advocated 8 — over time, humanity would evolve 
into a far more intelligent, moral, disease-resistant, strong, productive, beau-
tiful species.  “ We possess the power if we will, deliberately and consciously 
to create a new race, to mould the world of the future, ” Havelock Ellis wrote 
in 1911. With careful control over reproduction, one day the human race as 
a whole could be stronger, healthier, more intelligent, more talented, and of 
better moral and civic character than even the most successful and well- 
respected individuals presently alive. That was the eugenic vision of the 
Progressive Era. Racism infected it just as racism infects any ideology in a 
racist society; but racism was no more fundamental to it than it was to any 
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other social movement or institution in the twentieth century. By and large, 
twentieth-century eugenicists simply wanted the best possible future for their 
descendants. 
 They knew there were great technical diffi culties to be overcome. Well 
before the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s eugenic sterilization law 
( Buck v Bell , 1927), geneticists were pointing out that ridding the breeding 
population of people who express an undesirable trait does not eliminate 
the undesirable gene. Many traits are  “ recessive, ” so there are many more 
 “ carriers ” than individuals who are actually affl icted. In 1917, R. C. Punnett, 
a professor of genetics at Cambridge University, published results of a statis-
tical analysis based on the Hardy-Weinberg Principle which showed that 
even if 100% of genetically feeble-minded people were prevented from pro-
creating, it would take 684 generations to reduce the number of carriers to 
one in a million individuals.  “ Clearly, ” he wrote,  “ if that most desirable goal 
of a world rid of the feebleminded is to be reached in a reasonable time some 
method other than that of the elimination of the feeble-minded themselves 
must eventually be found. The great strength of this defect in the population 
lies in its heterozygotic reserves; if the campaign against it is to meet with 
success it is at these that it must be directed ” ( Punnett, 1917 , 465). Tests 
would have to be developed to identify carriers of all traits held to be  “ dys-
genic ” and measures put in place to eliminate those individuals, too, from the 
breeding population. Sterilization of people committed to state institutions for 
the mentally retarded or mentally ill could be mandated through legislation 
and court cases, but tracking down phenotypically normal carriers and pre-
venting them from engaging in procreative sex were a far more delicate mat-
ter, and state intervention was perhaps not the best or most effective means. 
 German eugenicists had invented marriage counseling in the 1910s as a 
way of infl uencing reproductive behavior in the general population. North 
American eugenicists were somewhat slow to take up the concept, but in 
1930 the fi rst marriage counseling center in the United States opened in Al-
tadena, California, with eugenicist Paul Popenoe as its energetic and dedi-
cated director. Funded through the Human Betterment Foundation by Ezra 
Gosney (co-author with Popenoe of the eugenic tract  Sterilization for 
 Human Betterment ), the American Institute for Family Relations (AIFR) an-
nounced at its opening that it would  “ disseminate eugenics information and 
endeavor to aid persons contemplating marriage to make a success of their 
venture ” ( Ladd-Taylor, 2001 , 311). In addition to dozens of informational 
publications, the AIFR offered premarital counseling (complete with physical 
examinations, personality inventories, and marital aptitude tests) emphasiz-
ing hereditary fi tness and compatibility, advice for couples having diffi cul-
ties, and training workshops for clergy, teachers, and other professionals 
who were themselves engaged in couples counseling. The primary goals 
were to convince  “ unfi t ” couples to refrain from procreating and to keep  “ fi t ” 
couples together so that they could procreate more. 
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 Popenoe’s pioneering efforts in marriage counseling (including his work 
with the AIFR as well as his many years as editor of  Marriage and Family 
Living , his two books  Modern Marriage: A Handbook (1925) and  Sex, Love, 
and Marriage (1963), his television talk show where Los Angeles couples 
could air their problems and receive his advice, and his long-running col-
umn in the  Ladies ’ Home Journal entitled  “ Can This Marriage Be Saved? ” ) 
were clearly recognized by his fellow eugenicists as an important contribu-
tion to their cause. Laws and governmental policies might restrain the repro-
ductive behavior of some of the  “ worst ” sorts of people, but heavy-handed 
measures would never operate effectively to insure reproduction among the 
 “ best. ” No democratic government could compel bright young men and 
women to marry and bear children. Incentives could be put in place — tax 
breaks, low-interest home loans, and the like — and bachelorhood could be 
made economically disadvantageous for middle-class men whereas employ-
ment and higher education could be made unattractive for middle-class 
women. But achievement of the eugenics movement’s positive goals would 
require the willing cooperation of individuals and families, and all the eu-
genicists of the early and mid-twentieth century knew that. The theories and 
institutions they built helped to create and perpetuate a society in which 
desire for genetically  “ superior ” offspring would be the norm and in which 
tolerance for any sort of biological or behavioral deviation was very low, a 
society in which ordinary individuals could be counted on to make eugenic 
choices without any offi cial compulsion. As Lee R. Dice, director of the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s Institute of Human Biology, put it,  “ If there is known to 
be a high probability of transmitting a serious defect, it would be an abnor-
mal person indeed who would not refrain from having children ” ( Dice, 1952 , 
2). Thus, in pursuit of eugenic social goals, was born the fi eld that in 1947 
geneticist Sheldon Reed dubbed  “ genetic counseling. ” 9 
 The birth preceded the christening by about 6 years. In 1941, Charles Fre-
mont Dight’s estate had conferred a substantial sum of money on the Uni-
versity of Minnesota which, according to his will, would  “ maintain a place 
for consultation and advice on heredity and eugenics and for rating of peo-
ple, fi rst, as to the effi ciency of their bodily structure; second, as to their 
mentality; third as to their fi tness to marry and reproduce ” ( Paul, 1995 , 123). 10 
In early 1948, soon after Reed gave the new fi eld its name, the Eugenics 
Record Offi ce (having been renamed the Genetics Record Offi ce in 1939) 
transferred most of the data Harry Laughlin and his staff had compiled to the 
Dight Institute, which by then was also supported by money from the estate 
of Charles M. Goethe, a fi nancier who devoted much of his life to eugenic 
work and served as president of the Eugenics Research Association in 1936 
( Black, 2003 , 315). The institute ran both a marriage counseling center and 
the fi rst genetics counseling center. Its director, Clarence P. Oliver, held that 
 “ a geneticist should prevail upon some persons to have at least their share 
of children as well as show a black picture to those with the potentiality of 
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producing children with undesirable traits ” ( Paul, 1995 , 126). Oliver left in 
1946 for at the University of Texas at Austin, where he continued his work 
in genetic counseling ( Dice, 1952 , 10). His successor was Sheldon Reed, 
who presided over Dight’s acquisition of Eugenics Record Offi ce materials . 
Reed took a less directive approach, asserting that  “ the decision must be a 
personal one between the husband and wife, and theirs alone ” ( Paul, 1995 , 
127). But like Lee Dice, his counterpart at the University of Michigan, Reed 
fi rmly believed that, provided with sound genetic information, individuals 
would make eugenic choices without pressure from experts. In 1952 he wrote, 
 “ If our observation is generally correct, that people of normal mentality, who 
thoroughly understand the genetics of their problems, will behave in the 
way that seems correct to society as a whole, then an important corollary 
follows. It could be stated as a principle that the mentally sound will volun-
tarily carry out a eugenics program which is acceptable to society if counseling 
in genetics is available to them ” ( Paul, 1995 , 128). Government need not 
impose eugenics programs on normal people. The ubiquitous pressures of 
modern life will steer them away from deviance and abnormality in their 
reproductive decisions. 
 Dice (1952 , 12) went on to list conditions he considered serious enough 
to warrant deciding not to reproduce and to argue for state funding to estab-
lish clinics for the purpose of advising couples and assisting with family 
planning:  “ Defective heredity which results in the production of serious 
handicaps, such as idiocy, blindness, deafness, dwarfi sm, muscular atrophy, 
anemia, hemophilia, or the tendency to other serious disease is not only a 
calamity for the families concerned, but constitutes a serious drain on the 
resources of the community ” . The state should fund physician training in 
genetics and establish free clinics to supply families with good information 
and good technologies, he argued, and then families will make the right —
 that is, the eugenic — decision. 
 Obviously, the authority of the physician or geneticist would carry a lot of 
weight with any couple who sought reproductive advice, and obviously the 
type of training the physician or geneticist received and the information 
available through research funded by corporations and government agencies 
would set the terms under which any individual or couple would be making 
these decisions about whether to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term. 11 
Prospective parents would have to rely to a great extent on the judgment of 
those authorities. If the authorities believed the birth of a deaf child or a 
 “ dwarf ” would be a family tragedy, no doubt many families would come to 
believe so as well. Eugenicists like Lee Dice certainly knew that. In fact, they 
were counting on it. 
 These changes in tactics, which were in part responses to international 
exposure and condemnation of Hitler’s eugenic program, eventually resulted 
in a generalized expunging of the word  eugenics from popular discourse, 
except as a term of condemnation. Eugenicists began to call themselves 
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population scientists and human geneticists ( Kuhl, 1994 , 105;  Bruinius, 2006 , 
317). Gradually, the word disappeared even from the organizations founded 
to further the movement’s programs. In 1954, the British  Annals of Eugenics 
renamed itself  Annals of Human Genetics . In 1969, the  Eugenics Quarterly 
became the  Journal of Social Biology. In 1972, the American Eugenics 
Society changed its name to the Society for the Study of Social Biology. 
Long-time American Eugenics Society President Frederick Osborn told an 
interviewer in 1977 that  “ it became evident that changes of a eugenic nature 
would be made for reasons other than eugenics, and  … tying a eugenic label 
on them would more often hinder than help their adoption. ” 12 But, as 
Osborn implies, the vision of a humanity purged of genetic defect and evolv-
ing toward a  “ higher ” state persisted. By the end of the twentieth century, 
sociologist Dorothy Nelkin and historian Susan Lindee observed,
 Eugenics in contemporary culture is less a state ideology than a set of ideals about 
a perfected and  “ healthy ” human future. Commonly held beliefs about the powers 
of the gene and the importance of heredity facilitate eugenic practices even in the 
absence of direct political control of reproduction, for eugenics is not simply gross 
coercion of individuals by the state  … . Rather, it can be productively understood as 
a constellation of beliefs about the importance of genetics in shaping human health 
and behavior, the nature of worthwhile life, the interests of society, and, especially, 
the meaning of reproductive responsibility. These beliefs — conveyed through the 
stories told by popular culture — draw on the assumption that our social, political, 
and economic future will depend on controlling the genetic constitution of the 
species — the so-called human gene pool ( Nelkin and Lindee, 1995 , 191). 
 Whether they are aware of the fact or not, contemporary advocates of hu-
man genetic engineering share both the goals and the rhetoric of many of 
the twentieth century’s most ardent avowed eugenicists. Knowingly or not, 
James Watson echoed Harry Laughlin when he told the London  Times in 
2003,  “ If you are really stupid, I would call that a disease  … . The lower 
10 per cent who really have diffi culty, even in elementary school, what’s 
the cause of that? A lot of people would like to say,  ‘ Well, poverty, things 
like that. ’ It probably isn’t. So I’d like to get rid of that, to help the lower 
10 per cent ” ( Bhattacharya, 2003 ). The means might differ as technology 
permits, but the goal is the same: to eliminate what Laughlin called  “ feeble-
mindedness ” or  “ social inadequacy ” and what Watson called  “ stupidity ” from 
the human gene pool. Likewise, Gregory Pence sounds a great deal like Lee 
Dice when he declares,  “ Although disability advocates insist that there is 
nothing wrong with being deaf, a dwarf, or having Down’s syndrome, no 
reasonable parent would choose to have a child with such a condition when 
he or she could have a normal child. Indeed, in my opinion, it might be  im-
moral to choose to have such a child if one could otherwise have a normal 
child ” ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 112). The idea that  “ evolution, as it has 
operated in the past, has essentially stopped for the human species, ” as 
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Gregory Stock of UCLA’s School of Medicine has declared ( Stock and 
 Campbell, 2000 , 93), corresponds directly to the views of the eugenicists 
such as William Partlow and Frederick Osborn, and, as in their writings, it 
serves as a cornerstone of Stock’s and others ’ calls for technical management 
of human reproduction. In fact, says University of Washington biologist  Leroy 
Hood, genetic technology is an improvement over natural selection.  “ We’re 
using exactly the same kinds of techniques used by evolution, but what 
we’re attempting to do, in a thoughtful and rational way, is to facilitate evo-
lution, so it doesn’t operate in a blind fashion — most of the changes being 
neutral or deleterious — but in an optimizing fashion ” ( Stock and Campbell, 
2000 , 92). His statement echoes that of eugenicist P. W. Whiting:  “ Eugenics 
is the study of those agencies under social control which may improve or 
impair the racial qualities of humanity either physically or mentally. And in 
its application it is essentially the intelligent control of human evolution ” 
( Whiting, 1925 , 165). The parallels and echoes are striking. 
 Watson, Pence, Stock, and Hood do not use the term  “ eugenics ” for what 
they advocate (although Watson does not hesitate to acknowledge that he is 
 “ going for perfection ” ( Abraham, 2002 , A1)), but some proponents of germ-
line engineering bite the bullet and embrace the term. In  Liberal Eugenics: 
In Defence of Human Enhancement , Nicholas Agar writes,  “ Hitler and 
 GATTACA [a science fi ction movie] have made eugenics an unpopular idea. 
However, being unpopular is not the same as being wrong ” ( Agar, 2004 , vii). 
And  John Harris (2000 , 95) happily accepts the label:  “ I don’t disagree with 
people who argue that gene therapy to remove a disability is a form of 
 eugenics, I specifi cally adopt the Oxford English Dictionary defi nition of 
eugenics as  ‘ pertaining  … to the production of fi ne offspring ’ and say if this 
is what eugenics is everyone should favour eugenics ” . Instead of shying 
away from the word, these writers challenge their readers to consider the 
questions: What, if anything, is wrong with eugenics? What is wrong with 
attempting to manage and control human evolutionary development? 
 IV .  LIFE ENTERS HISTORY: A BIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS 
 If the current debate is a political struggle rather than an ethical deliberation, 
as I have argued above, that challenge is best deferred. Instead, it would be 
more prudent to step back from the fray and the dichotomous choices it 
tends to offer us and examine the epistemic, material, and historical context 
in which  “ eugenics ” carries such a powerful charge. Here is where Fou-
cault’s genealogical tools and concepts become especially valuable. 
 Foucault discusses eugenics explicitly in Part IV of  The History of  Sexuality, 
Volume 1 . Eugenics was one of  “ the two great innovations in the technology 
of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century, ” he writes, the other be-
ing  “ the medicine of perversions. ” The study of heredity and the analyses it 
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produced placed  “ sex (sexual relations, venereal diseases, matrimonial alli-
ances, perversions) in a position of  ‘ biological responsibility ’ with regard to 
the species  … . [I]t appeared to be the source of an entire capital for the spe-
cies to draw from. Whence the medical — but also political — project for orga-
nizing a state management of marriages, births, and life expectancies; sex 
and its fertility had to be administered ” ( 1978 , 118). Meanwhile, the medicine 
of perversions made it clear that  “ not only could sex be affected by its own 
diseases, it could also, if it was not controlled, transmit diseases or create 
others that would affl ict future generations ” ( 1978 , 118). The very close alli-
ance between North American and British eugenicists on the one hand and 
sexologists on the other makes perfect sense when we look at eugenics and 
sexology as merging technologies in the  dispositif de sexualité. The  dispositif 
de sexualité itself must be situated, however, within the dynamic confi gura-
tion of force relations that  Foucault (1978 , 140) names  “ biopower ” , which in 
turn must be situated within the problematic of what he calls  “ governmental-
ity ” ( Foucault, 2007 , 108). 
 The defi nition of  “ governmentality ” varies in Foucault’s writings. In a 1984 
interview, he defi ned it very broadly:  “ I intend this concept of  ‘ governmen-
tality ’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, defi ne, organize, 
and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use 
in dealing with each other ” ( Foucault, 1997c , 300). Taken in this sense, we 
would have to say that all societies have had techniques and practices of 
governmentality, different though they may have been. When he fi rst intro-
duced the word (in his 1978 lecture course), however, he offered a more 
historically bound defi nition, restricting the word to a set of procedures, 
analyses and knowledges, techniques, and institutions that developed in 
Western Europe after the fi fteenth century (see  2007 , 108 – 109). Given the 
parameters of our historical scope here, either defi nition will suffi ce. 
 In that lecture course — now translated and published under the title 
 Security, Territory, Population — Foucault notes a shift in the problematic of 
large-scale government in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries. As feudalism 
declined, market towns appeared, wherein people amassed and goods 
 circulated. This phenomenon created some new governmental concerns. On 
the one hand, towns were to be encouraged because they provided a sover-
eign with means to acquire new wealth. On the other hand, masses of 
townspeople were more apt than scattered serfs to revolt, particularly if food 
became scarce, and they were also more apt to suffer from plagues and die 
suddenly in unprofi tably large numbers. Towns, then, were sites of danger. 
For the sovereign to be strong, towns had to thrive, but those towns had to 
be governed to offset the risks they harbored. So people began to refl ect on 
the practice of government and develop new techniques — which Foucault 
calls techniques of security — until, by the end of the eighteenth century or 
the beginning of the nineteenth, a whole new confi guration of power rela-
tions began to emerge. Though the periodization and terminology are a bit 
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loose in Foucault’s work and need to remain so to prevent their reifi cation, 
we can call this new confi guration of power relations, this new form of gov-
ernmentality,  “ biopower. ” 
 Biopower actually grows out of two initially separate efforts,  Foucault 
(1978 , 140) says:  “ the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations ” . 
Efforts to subjugate bodies — particularly bodies found in relatively large 
numbers within institutional structures where some type of production was 
the aim — took the form of disciplinary practices. In  Discipline and Punish 
(1975), Foucault tells the story of how early modern disciplinary techniques 
developed as monastic ascetic practices migrated to the secular domains of 
the military, the factory, the asylum, the penitentiary, etc. He summarizes 
that development in the 1978 lecture course: Discipline  “ analyzes and breaks 
down  … individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and operations. It 
breaks them down into components such that they can be seen, on the one 
hand, and modifi ed on the other ” ( 2007 , 56). Then it classifi es those compo-
nents in relation to its objectives and establishes  “ optimal sequences or co-
ordinations ” to produce a performative ideal. It next designs a program of 
training to achieve that ideal in each case. Finally, on the basis of this ideal 
and program it identifi es those individuals who are unsuitable or incapable. 
 “ Disciplinary normalization consists fi rst of all in positing a model, an opti-
mal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation 
of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, 
and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which 
can conform to this norm, and the abnormal being that which is incapable 
of conforming to the norm ” ( 2007 , 57). 13 
 Discipline becomes, strictly speaking,  normalizing discipline in the eigh-
teenth century when disciplinarians begin to posit a kind of natural develop-
mental force within the bodies they try to train — that is, when discipline 
ceases to be understood as an imposition on a body conceived as a machine-
like collection of parts and becomes a technique for cultivating the natural 
resources of the body conceived as a natural developmental trajectory. 
 Foucault (1977 , 155) locates an early example of this in the military disci-
pline of J. A. de Guibert: If left alone, the disciplinarian imagines, this natural 
body would develop in its own direction at its own rate. The job of the nor-
malizing disciplinarian is to harness the energy of that natural developmental 
force and redirect it, cultivating and intensifying it to the extent possible. 
Thus, the objective correlate and target of normalizing discipline is the 
 natural, developmental body. 
 The objective correlate and target of population management, the other 
component of biopower that Foucault identifi es, is  “ an absolutely new politi-
cal personage ” in the eighteenth century;  “ this new personage  … is the 
population ” ( 2007 , 67).  “ [T]he population is not the simple sum of individu-
als inhabiting a territory ” ( 2007 , 70) but a kind of being unto itself. Like the 
developmental body, the population is conceived as a natural phenomenon. 
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Its naturalness is evident in three ways. First, the population is dependent 
through the course of its existence — and for the particularities of that 
course — on a set of variables such as climate, material surroundings, the 
circulation of wealth, customs, and means of subsistence. This means that a 
sovereign cannot effectively govern a population simply by issuing com-
mands, any more than a disciplinarian, merely by issuing commands, can 
train a developmental body. There is an inherent recalcitrance within a pop-
ulation that is a natural, nonvoluntary aspect of its existence. Second, popu-
lations encompass disparate groups of people, but there is one thing common 
to all people, namely, desire. If desire is allowed free play, in time a general 
interest will emerge which can be attributed not to those disparate people 
but to the population itself. This general interest is the population’s natural 
inclination or tendency; though produced through the pursuits of individu-
als, it is not artifi ce. Third, populations evince constancies that cannot be 
attributed to individuals and their choices, even collectively. For example, at 
the end of the seventeenth century, statistical analysis revealed the astonish-
ing fact that birth rates, death rates, and even rates of suicide in given popu-
lations were fairly constant from year to year; populations had natural 
regularities that, qua regularities, could not be attributed to the deliberate 
decisions of the individuals they comprised. This natural vitality, this  “ life 
course, ” of a population could not be ignored if one aimed to govern effec-
tively. It had to be studied and harnessed. 
 Foucault maintains that the techniques that evolved for governing market 
towns — which became modern techniques of security for governing 
 populations — initially differed radically from techniques of normalizing dis-
cipline. The idea was not to train and cultivate the population but to protect 
and secure the processes that constituted it from disruption. The dangers 
earlier identifi ed as threats to the sovereign through the town (which were 
also threats to the ongoing vitality of the town itself) had to be controlled. 
The circulation of goods and people — and eventually, in liberal states, infor-
mation and ideas — had to be as free and unimpeded as possible so that the 
town and the various sorts of markets it represented and sustained could 
remain healthy. The population (as distinct to although not separable from 
the collection of individuals in a territory) was beginning to take on a life of 
its own. 
 As the concept of population emerged — as it was carved, Foucault says, 
out of a fi eld of reality through the constant interplay of power and its ob-
jects ( 2007 , 79) — statistical techniques evolved for keeping track of those 
constituting processes. As a classic example, Foucault mentions the bureau-
cratic techniques for managing smallpox. By the eighteenth century, it was 
widely believed — purely on the basis of empirical evidence absent any theo-
retical explanation — that introducing a small amount of pus from smallpox 
lesions (or lesions of similar poxes) into a healthy person’s body could pro-
tect that person from getting sick with smallpox. Public offi cials studied this 
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phenomenon statistically and concluded that indeed inoculation was pre-
ventive, so they instituted programs of vaccination, which they then used 
statistical methods to monitor. They studied the population as a whole, but 
they also studied subpopulations — age groups, professional groups, etc., 
what we would now call different demographic groups. For some groups, 
they noted that the risk of infection was higher than it was for others, and 
for some populations with the same rates of infection, mortality rates were 
higher. There was also a calculable risk of sickening and dying from pox 
induced by vaccination or of the vaccination failing to protect against disease 
during subsequent exposure. Out of studies such as these came  “ the idea of 
a  ‘ normal ’ morbidity or mortality. ” Then, total population morbidity and 
mortality were subdivided to yield rates for subpopulations — specifi c age 
groups or certain professional groups or the residents of different locales. 
 “ Thus one will have the normal, overall curve, and different curves consid-
ered to be normal ” for these subpopulations ( 2007 , 62). 
 Once a set of norms is established, offi cials look for ways  “ to reduce the 
most unfavorable, deviant normalities in relation to the normal, general 
curve, to bring them in line with this normal, general curve ” ( 2007 , 62). So, 
for example, if it were discovered that residents of one sector were dying 
at a higher rate than the general norm, attention could be focused on that 
sector in its differences from others to determine what conditions might 
be altered to yield a more favorable outcome. Whatever the chosen means, 
the goal would not be to prevent all deaths in that sector but to  “ normalize ” 
the sector’s norm, to shift its normal curve. This is the case whether what 
is at issue is morbidity, mortality, births, literacy, crime, or commodities 
consumption. 
 This technique of governing bespeaks something entirely different from 
the old sovereign concern with holding and expanding territory and exploit-
ing its resources as wealth. Now  “ we see the emergence of a completely 
different problem that is no longer that of fi xing and demarcating the terri-
tory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting 
the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, con-
stantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in 
such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out ” 
( 2007 , 65). Techniques of security are means for governing a free, natural 
vitality: a living population. Unlike sovereign power, security fosters rather 
than prohibits. Moreover, unlike disciplinary techniques (hygienic regimes, 
dividing practices, medical treatments, etc.), which aim at eradication of dis-
ease (crime, illiteracy, etc.) through subjugation of individual bodies, tech-
niques of security do not aim to prevent all death (crime, illiteracy, etc.), 
only to change the rate at which it occurs. Thus, individual bodies are not 
their concern, only bodies in their statistical signifi cance. 
 Mechanisms and institutions based on these two newly emerging but dif-
ferent types of technique — techniques of security governing populations and 
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techniques of disciplinary normalization governing developing bodies — 
coalesced in the nineteenth century to form wide networks of new force 
relations. Foucault characterizes as these collectively as  “ biopower ” because 
of their tendency to cultivate vital capacities — those of the body as well as 
those of the population — and redirect and subsume the energy of resistance 
rather than simply eliminate opposition through lethal violence. The advent 
of biopower, he proclaims, is  “ nothing less than the entry of life into history, 
that is, the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into 
the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques ” 
( 1978 , 141 – 2). 14 
 V .  NORMALIZING POPULATIONS: BIOPOWER’S DEPLOYMENT OF 
SEXUALITY 
 As life entered history, techniques of government shifted radically because 
what was to be governed was no longer given sets of entities but malleable 
trajectories of development — individual, collective, and specifi c. For nearly a 
century, however, techniques aimed at individuals and techniques aimed at 
populations developed in parallel but not in unison. They fi nally came to-
gether, Foucault tells us, not fi rst of all in a theoretical discourse but rather  “ in 
the form of concrete arrangements ( agencements concrets ) that would go to 
make up the great technology of power in the nineteenth century: the de-
ployment of sexuality would be one of them, and one of the most important ” 
( 1978 , 140). And, as already noted, the two great — and reciprocally reinforc-
ing — innovations in that deployment as the twentieth century drew near were 
the  “ medicine of perversions and the programs of eugenics ” ( 1978 , 118). 
 The eugenics movement came into being at the point where the man-
agement of populations took on some of the elements of normalizing 
 discipline — where, we might say, populations as such became subjects not 
only of security techniques but also of disciplinary practices. With the birth 
of eugenics, the goal of population management was no longer simply to 
facilitate a population’s natural life course and protect its vital processes 
from disruption but to increase its capacities through intense cultivation. 
 It began with the fear that modern medicine and charitable practices were 
inhibiting the effects of natural selection. The population (and, depending 
on the theorist, this might be the entirety of the human species or a particu-
lar nation or a racially defi ned subgroup such as the  “ Nordics ” ) was there-
fore becoming weaker. In other words, the normal curve for  “ fi tness ” in the 
current generation was inferior to the normal curve for  “ fi tness ” in previous 
generations. Steps had to be taken to  “ normalize ” the inferior curve, to make 
the current population as  “ fi t ” as its normal predecessors. Few eugenicists 
advocated killing weak people in pre-pubescence to mimic the action of 
natural selection, but they did advocate the next best thing: eliminating them 
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from the breeding population so that the next generation would not carry 
their genes. 
 Thus described, eugenics is classic population management on Foucault’s 
terms, a set of interventions aimed at  “ normalizing ” an undesired  “ normal-
ity. ” But of course, eugenics has always been much more than a mere cor-
rective. Eugenicists did not want to bring the normal curve of the least 
successful subpopulations in line with the general norm; they wanted to cre-
ate a new general norm, in part by altering or  “ enhancing ” the norm of the 
most successful subpopulations. They wanted to respecify human normality. 
The goal was to increase populations ’ existing abilities and create new ones 
through projects of cultivation and directed development. In other words, 
they sought to apply the principles of developmental discipline to select 
populations, to subjugate populations as their predecessors and contempo-
raries had subjugated bodies. Eugenics was not only population manage-
ment; eugenics was biopower. 
 In biopolitical processes, normalcy is not to be discovered or restored; 
instead, as George Annas observed in regard to enhancement proposals, 
 “ normalcy will be invented ” ( Annas, 1989 , 21). Like their eugenic predeces-
sors, contemporary proponents of genetic enhancement explicitly reject the 
existing general standards of human normalcy. According to John Harris, 
 “ enhancements are not plausibly defi ned relative to normalcy, to normal 
species functioning, nor to species-typical functioning  … ” ( Harris, 2007 , 36). 
University of California-Irvine School of Biological Sciences professor Mi-
chael Rose asserts,  “ You have to reject this concept of normal. You have to 
take what evolution does and look at it askance, exploit what it does well, 
and provide what it does not provide ” ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 93). Like 
eugenicists throughout the twentieth century, genetic engineering’s advo-
cates want to change human normalcy itself. 
 In the early eugenics movement, management of sexuality was seen as the 
key to management of all aspects of human development, including the evolu-
tion of populations; who could have sex with whom was a fundamental issue, 
therefore, which meant that in the pursuit of a better human future a great deal 
of sexual oppression was inevitable. Twenty-fi rst-century eugenicists like to 
distinguish themselves from that movement by emphasizing their much more 
liberal attitude toward individuals ’ sexual practices; the fact that new repro-
ductive technologies will enable same-sex couples to produce children geneti-
cally related to both partners is often touted as evidence of the radically 
nonauthoritarian stance that modern genetic engineers take to sexuality. 15 But, 
although this may be a welcome change for those whose sexuality has been 
most painfully oppressed, it is a technical change only, not a change of prin-
ciple. Had nonsexual technologies of reproduction existed in the early twen-
tieth century, early eugenicists no doubt would have seized upon them and 
might well have abandoned sexually oppressive policies as a result. They 
were very capable of changing tactics when new obstacles or opportunities 
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presented themselves: witness the rapidity with which most of them let go of 
racial classifi cation when use of it became ineffective in achieving their mana-
gerial goals, and, after World War II, their willingness to fi nd means to infl u-
ence reproductive decisions without direct use of the policing mechanisms of 
the state. Glayde Whitney’s delight with the possibilities of genetic engineering 
technologies for the new millennium no doubt would have been shared by 
virtually all of his predecessors. James Watson certainly shares it.  “ It seems to 
me the question we’re going to have to face is, what is going to be the least 
unpleasant? Using abortion to get rid of nasty genes from families? Or develop-
ing germ-line procedures with which, using Mario Capecchi’s techniques, you 
can go in and get rid of a bad gene, ” he asks.  “ And  … if we could make better 
human beings by knowing how to add genes, why shouldn’t we do it? Who 
is telling us not to do it? I mean, it just seems obvious now ” ( Stock and Camp-
bell, 2000 , 79). Watson gleefully predicts that someday, through germ-line 
engineering, we will be able to  “ turn slow learners into whiz kids, ” prevent 
smokers from getting lung cancer, and make our offspring resistant to HIV 
( Abraham, 2002 ). Thus, perhaps eventually, germ-line engineering could make 
eugenic management of sexual conduct unnecessary without sacrifi cing any of 
the eugenic vision. 
 VI .  THE TECHNOLOGY, THE VISION, AND THE QUESTION 
 Early eugenic technologies were extremely crude by today’s standards — 
vasectomy, salpingectomy, life-long incarceration in single-sex facilities for 
those deemed  “ socially inadequate, ” threats thereof for those who were  “ ad-
equate ” but likely to stray from the path of heterosexual monogamy, tight 
regulation of birth control information, and various strategies for limiting 
white middle class women’s life options to marriage and motherhood. Con-
sequently, the results were mixed and, at least when measured by demo-
cratic values, at times lamentable. The movement was severely criticized for 
its errors and excesses, both technological and social, in pursuit of its goals. 
But in a world where biopower predominates, the goals themselves were 
never seriously critiqued, much less rejected.  “ Eugenic principles are part of 
our largely unexamined and often unspoken ideology — preconceptions the 
society instills in us about who should and should not inhabit the world, ” 
feminist biologist Ruth Hubbard declares ( Hubbard, 1986 , 240), which is 
why John Harris can plausibly assert that:  “ Whatever people say, no one, I 
believe, actually thinks that there is anything in principle wrong with the 
enhancement of human beings ” ( Harris, 2007 , 8). In fact, to question the 
basic goals of eugenics is to question the basis of the contemporary indus-
trialized world’s social organization. In a biopolitical society, where cultiva-
tion and intensifi cation of vital forces in both individuals and populations are 
imperative, eugenics must go forward as technology permits. 
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 Of course, contra Harris, there are  many people who  do think there is 
something wrong with genetic enhancement. Some people reject the theory 
of evolution altogether in favor of the idea that a deity created human beings 
exactly as we are now, which makes any attempt to  “ enhance ” our genomes 
fundamentally hubristic. Others, like Harvard political theorist Michael 
 Sandel, say genetic enhancement — which he equates with purchasing up-
grades for embryos as one might for a computer — will corrupt important 
values; he predicts it will lead to erosion of the ideal of unconditional paren-
tal love, diminution in appreciation of athletic and artistic accomplishment, 
arrogance rather than humility and gratitude in the face of our own or our 
children’s talents, and loss of compassion for those who suffer ( Sandel, 2007 , 
96). In other words, even if enhancing the human genome is not sinful in 
itself, the spiritual consequences of success are dire. 
 Others fear the economic and social consequences, especially the creation 
of, as Mitchell and Hooks put it, two distinct and unequal classes: the men-
tally and physically upgraded versus the rest of us — or, at least, those who 
have had the privilege until now of bearing the label of  “ normal. ” As  New 
York Times columnist David Brooks observed regarding currently available 
reproductive technologies,  “ At this very moment thousands of people are 
surfi ng the Web looking for genetic material so their children will be nothing 
like me ” ( Brooks, 2007 ). Perhaps those future people, who unlike normal 
members of our generation will have  good reason to consider themselves 
better than their parents, will treat us as poorly as we have treated the 
classes of people we have judged to be inferior to ourselves. 
 Advocates of enhancement rightly point out that introducing new kinds of 
difference into our society will not create unjust discrimination; such dis-
crimination is a product of intolerance, not difference. Furthermore, contra 
Sandel, our society at present does not place much value on unenhanced 
athletic and artistic accomplishment (witness the widespread use of 
 performance-enhancing drugs in professional sports and the low incomes of 
artists of all kinds), nor does it routinely evince gratitude for talents or even 
unconditional love for ordinary children. If our spiritual values are threat-
ened with erosion, factors other than genetic engineering are the cause. 
 But successful genetic enhancement is not what many critics fear; rather, 
they dread the price that will be paid for the possibility of success through 
the process of discovery. Science and technology advance through experi-
ment, trial and error. When trials and errors involve computer models, fruit 
fl ies, or mice, most people are willing to accept some negative side-effects. 
But at some point genetic enhancements techniques will have to be tried —
 before they are perfected — on human embryos who may become human 
fetuses inside the bodies of human women and then human babies deserv-
ing of all the care and bearing all the rights of any other human being. 
 To understand why these facts create such concern, some knowledge of 
current technology is indispensable. Geneticist Mario Cappechi describes the 
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most promising method of gene transfer, preimplantation embryonic genetic 
modifi cation :
 In vitro fertilization using sperm and eggs donated by each set of parents would be 
used to generate one-cell embryos. In culture, the embryo would be permitted to 
progress to the four-cell stage. The embryo would then be separated into four cells: 
three of these cells would be frozen for later use. These are procedures routinely 
carried out in IVF clinics. Each of these four cells, frozen or unfrozen, would have 
an identical set of genes and would be capable of generating a normal child. The 
fourth cell would be allowed to divide in culture until a million cells were gener-
ated, taking approximately twenty cell divisions to achieve this number. Different 
embryonic cell types would then be present within this cell population, but this 
diversity should not affect the procedure. One million cells is an ample population 
size to permit the use of technologies, such as gene targeting, to introduce the de-
sired genetic alteration into a subset of these cells. The subset of cells containing the 
desired genetic alteration would be isolated from the remaining cell population and 
carefully characterized to ensure that the genetic modifi cation was accurate. At this 
point, the nucleus of one of the mother’s oocytes would be removed and replaced 
with a nucleus from the expanded pool of cells containing the prescribed genetic 
modifi cation. In this cytoplasmic environment, the modifi ed nucleus would receive 
instructions to commence making an embryo. The cells would be allowed to divide 
in culture once or twice, and then the embryo would be surgically transferred to the 
mother’s womb to allow pregnancy to continue. A child produced in this way would 
contain the genetic modifi cation, introduced in cell culture, in all of his or her cells, 
including the germ cells ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 35 – 7). 
 This is a technically complex, multistage process. Consequently, within it 
there are many opportunities for failure. At present,  in vitro fertilization 
without any attempt at genetic alteration results in a successful pregnancy in 
less than 25% of attempts. Given the odds of losing any individual embryo, 
genetic engineers would likely generate several altered embryos — clones, to 
ensure that the desired modifi cation was present in all of them — and either 
implant multiple embryos initially or freeze some for a potential second at-
tempt. Still, even with several spare clones for repeated attempts, the desired 
outcome, a healthy genetically altered human being, would not be assured. 
 Preimplantation embryonic genetic modifi cation (PGM) has been used to 
engineer domesticated food animals in efforts to produce more muscle mass 
for consumption. In some experiments, pigs with altered genomes were born, 
but the new genes did not actually bring about muscle gain. In a cattle experi-
ment,  “ [w]hen gene transfer was accomplished, the transgenic calf initially 
exhibited muscle hypertrophy, but muscle degeneration and wasting soon 
followed. Unable to stand, the debilitated animal was killed ” ( Gordon, 1999 , 
2023). According to geneticist French Anderson, 95% – 99.9% of all engineered 
animal embryos are damaged ( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 46). In addition, 
 “ [b]ecause most methods produce animals with different levels of foreign 
gene expression, further breeding is required to produce animals with stable 
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and properly functioning foreign genes ” ( Dresser, 2004 , 197 – 8), a process not 
likely to be acceptable to parents who pay for and expect genetic modifi ca-
tion in their own children or to genetically modifi ed individuals who might 
not want to  “ breed ” exclusively with predesignated partners for two or three 
generations.  “ In sum, it is diffi cult to reconcile the optimism regarding human 
PGM with the state of the science. At the same time, the rosy predictions 
about PGM support the need for an adequate oversight system to prevent 
premature human applications ” ( Dresser, 2004 , 198). 16 Clearly, the technology 
is not risk free and may generate many unpredictable consequences. 
 Enhancement enthusiasts like to couch the ethical question entirely in 
terms of whether it is right or wrong to genetically enhance people once the 
techniques are safe and affordable, not whether it is right or wrong to devote 
resources to developing enhancement technology or to risk people’s health 
and lives in genetic experiments. But asking whether it is right or wrong to 
alter a person’s genome to lengthen her lifespan or increase her intelligence 
is, at present, like asking whether it is right or wrong to colonize Mars. We 
can imagine such a thing, but it would be technically very diffi cult, expen-
sive, and hazardous. Should we ever colonize Mars? Should we begin prepa-
rations to colonize Mars in the next fi scal year? Ethically speaking, these are 
two entirely different questions. The shift to the  “ ever ” question regarding 
genetic enhancement is a politically adroit means of masking the concrete 
ethical questions about what we — scientists and citizens — might or might 
not do with our resources and our bodies right now. And, despite several 
years of allegedly ethical debate, those questions remain. 
 VII .  DREAMS, VALUES, AND CHOICES 
 As we deliberate over these ethical questions, we might reasonably demand 
not only honest assessments of risks and accurate accounts of who will benefi t 
fi nancially at every step but also clear statements of the vision to which we are 
being exhorted to dedicate ourselves and our progeny. What are the motive 
forces and the managerial  telos of this proposed evolutionary project? 
 In the last century, many eugenic projects were motivated by white su-
premacy and fears of racial impurity and decline. The dream was that some-
day the savages and throwbacks would go extinct so that the more intelligent 
and evolved races would move forward unencumbered to take intellectual 
and technological possession of the globe. Today, replacing the old eugenics 
movement’s underlying hope for racial and national purifi cation and material 
advance, we hear the recurring themes of individual gain and personal im-
mortality. The world of the future will be ever more fast-paced, complex, 
and populated, and it would surely be wrong to deny our children the tools 
they need to compete against others successfully — advantages like disease 
resistance, back-up organs, intelligence upgrades, memory augmentation, 
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switches to turn off the genes that make us age.  “ Parents are expected to 
give their children the best possible opportunities in life, ” says biophysicist 
and Spectrum Medical Sciences CEO Burke Zimmerman ( Stock and  Campbell, 
2000 , 125). In genetic enhancement discourse, post-World War II consum-
erism and middle class family values always prevail over environmental 
concerns, civic-minded self-restraint, and alternative family value systems 
wherein building a child’s character might be far more important than pur-
chasing opportunities for his or her future professional or fi nancial success. 
Is that what we want? 
 And of course all these alterations — these vulnerability reductions — will 
tend to increase longevity, leading John Harris to call personal immortality 
the  “ Holy Grail ” of genetic enhancement ( Harris, 2007 , 59). James Watson 
speculates  “ that hang-gliding accidents might one day be the leading cause 
of death ” ( Abraham, 2002 ). And Michael Rose describes, based on his ex-
periments with fruit fl ies, a future in which Americans of all ages will have 
the mortality rate of present-day 10- to 15-year-olds, a rate that would allow 
most of us (Americans, at least) to live to be about 1,200 years old and some 
of us (those who refuse to hang-glide perhaps) to reach the age of 2,000 
( Stock and Campbell, 2000 , 49). Perhaps evolution, which of course involves 
death, could be managed out of existence altogether someday. Is that what 
we want? 
 Dreams of life everlasting are nothing new. Nor are prescriptions for real-
izing such dreams; many cultures have promoted practices designed to win 
immortality for those who dedicate themselves and their resources to the 
pursuit. Immorality through genetic modifi cation is merely biopower’s ver-
sion of that very ancient dream. Despite the claims of today’s biopolitical 
dreamers, however, the question is not whether their fantasies are morally 
right or wrong. Rather, the question is a much more immediate and mun-
dane one, that of whether we will in fact comply with attempts to make their 
dream reality. 
 The question is whether we ourselves will or will not embrace those val-
ues and visions and all that they entail, whether we will commit resources to 
this project rather than to others, whether we will accept the inevitable er-
rors and attendant suffering the process of discovery and implementation 
will bring, whether we will prepare for the environmental and social conse-
quences of an affl uent population’s intensifi ed capacities and greatly pro-
longed life. These are questions not just about what we will do but about 
who we will be, what sort of lives we will lead and will allow those around 
us to lead, and what those lives will mean. These are truly ethical questions, 
questions of  ethos . 
 In the midst of these questions, Foucault does not tell us that we should 
or should not campaign to ban genetic engineering, that we should or should 
not offer our gametes for experimentation, and that we should or should not 
clone ourselves. Foucault does not tell us what to do. He will only remind 
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us that all dilemmas — in fact, all problematizations — are historical, contin-
gent, structured by power relations and that, therefore, the tools of geneal-
ogy can be useful as we seek insight into the options put before us. If 
through such analysis we fi nd the values and political valences underlying 
the debates over genetic enhancement distasteful or unsettling, we can resist 
their imperatives and develop new questions and options for action. For 
what Foucault does tell us, again and again, is that the current confi guration 
of knowledge and power is not inevitable; it can change, and we can change 
it. Ethics is a transformative practice of freedom. In fact, creative ethical 
 process may be far richer with transformative possibility than any genetic 
modifi cation that any of us has yet imagined. 
 NOTES 
  1 .  Lee Silver prefaces his book with this declaration:  “ Throughout, I will explore the ethical argu-
ments that have been raised against the use of this technology. In most instances, I will attribute opposi-
tion to conscious or subconscious fears of treading in  ‘ God’s domain ’ . Indeed, I will argue that nearly all 
of the objections raised by bioethicists and others ring hollow with one exception not often considered. 
The power of reprogenetics is so great that if left to the market, those families and groups  not able to 
afford it could become severely disadvantaged ” ( Silver, 1998 , 13). 
  2 .  For background on both Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund, see  Tucker (2002) and 
 Lombardo (2002) . Broadcast journalist Peter Jennings explored the Pioneer Fund and its relationship to 
production of the controversial book  The Bell Curve in a 1994 airing of  “ ABC World News Tonight. ” A 
partial transcript of the show entitled  “ The Bell Curve and the Pioneer Fund ” can be found at  http://www.
hardford-hwp.com/archives/45/049.html . 
  3 .  John Harris ’ attack on Leon Kass in Chapter 8 of his 2007 book is a case in point. I disagree with 
Kass ’ position myself, but ridicule is not the tactic of a philosopher engaging an interlocutor in genuine 
ethical deliberation. 
  4 .  Many writers have noted that it is diffi cult to draw a fi rm distinction between genetic therapy 
and genetic enhancement. One reason is technological; if genetic alterations are performed on embryos, 
it is diffi cult to prevent them from affecting the germ cells and thus being passed to the next generation. 
In fact, even in somatic cell therapy in adult men, some tests have indicated that foreign DNA is present 
in the seminal fl uid ( Dresser, 2004 , 201). But the main reason is conceptual. Suppose, for example, that 
we  “ treat ” mild cases of mental retardation by inserting DNA that would elevate the IQ. Is this therapy or 
enhancement? A great deal depends on how we defi ne the words  enhancement and  normal . Lee Silver 
contends,  “ In every instance, genetic engineering will be used to add something to a child’s genome that 
didn’t exist in the genomes of either of its parents. Thus, in every case, genetic engineering will be ge-
netic enhancement ” ( Silver, 1998 , 268). 
  5 .  For a transcript of a discussion about eugenics including Crick, Lederberg, and others, see 
 Wolstenholme (1963 , 274 – 98). For some of Tatum’s remarks, see  Tatum (1966) . Dobzhansky served on the 
board of directors of the American Eugenics Society in the 1950s ( Paul, 1998 , 142) and wrote an introduc-
tion to Frederick  Osborn’s (1968) book, where he lamented the bad name that eugenics had acquired.  “ Yet 
eugenics has a sound core, ” he stated.  “ The real problem which mankind will not be able to evade indefi -
nitely is where the evolutionary process is taking man, and where man himself wishes to go. Mr. Osborn 
has for several decades been the clear-sighted leader of the eugenical movement in America, who strove 
to make the substance of eugenics scientifi c and its name respectable again ” ( Osborn, 1968 , vi). 
  6 .  Among them was well-known physician W. Duncan McKim. In his 1900 book  Heredity and Hu-
man Progress , McKim proposed death by carbonic acid gas for defectives, including moral defectives. See 
 McKim (1900 , 193). His book received a generally favorable review in the November 1, 1900, edition of 
 The Nation (pages 349 – 50). 
  7 .  California’s law, under which offi cials authorized the sterilization of over 30,000 Americans, was 
written with Laughlin’s draft as a model, which in turn served as a model for the German law put into 
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effect in 1933 under the Nazis. In 1936, Hitler bestowed a medal of honor on Laughlin for his eugenics 
work. 
  8 .  In 1914, Harry Laughlin addressed the First National Conference on Race Betterment in Battle 
Creek, Michigan. The title of his talk was  “ Calculations on the Working Out of a Proposed Program of 
Sterilization, ” a text that was in fact the fi nal section of the American Breeders ’ Association Report on  “ The 
Best Practical Means of Cutting Off Defective Germ-Plasm in the American Population. ”  “ The proportion 
of the population which it is sought to cut off, ” Laughlin told his audience,  “ is the lowest ten percent of 
the human stock who are so meagerly endowed by Nature that their perpetuation would constitute a 
social menace ” ( Bruinius, 2006 , 212). 
  9 .  Paul (1995 , 123). In  Paul (1998 , Chapter 8), he discusses the complexity of Reed’s position on 
genetic counseling. He believed those who sought counseling were generally of higher intellectual qual-
ity than average, so despite physical disabilities he often encouraged reproduction, even though he real-
ized that in some respects the long-term results would be  “ dysgenic. ” Reed preferred to run the risk of a 
physically disabled child rather than the risk of removing eugenically valuable talents and intelligence 
from the gene pool. The fi eld of genetic counseling has changed over the years. In 1971, Sarah Lawrence 
graduated its fi rst class of students with master’s degrees in genetic counseling; these students were nei-
ther geneticists nor physicians. From that point forward, the majority of genetics counselors have been 
female and received training in client-centered therapy. See  Paul (1998 , 147 – 8) and  Paul (2002 , 96). How-
ever, whether this difference in training really translates into a nondirective approach has been seriously 
questioned. See, for example,  Patterson and Satz (2002) . 
  10 .  For a lengthier account of this set of events as well as other information about the twentieth-
century eugenics movement, see  McWhorter (2009 , Chapters 5 and 6). 
  11 .  By 1972, many eugenicists considered abortion of defective fetuses a  “ therapeutic ” option open 
to physicians, even though individual women did not yet have the right to obtain an abortion for reasons 
of their own, except in the state of New York. 
  12 .  This latter statement is quoted in  Paul (1995 , 125).  Paul (1998) quotes a statement Osborn made 
in a 1968 interview:  “ birth control and abortion are turning out to be great eugenic advances of our time. 
If they had been advanced for eugenic reasons, it would have retarded or stopped their acceptance ” 
(142). Apparently, these name changes were deliberate efforts to disguise what Osborn and others saw 
as important eugenic work. 
  13 .  The abnormal — or the  “ residue ” as Foucault calls it in  Psychiatric Power (2006, 53) — is the jus-
tifi cation for the extension and creation of new disciplinary institutions and practices. For example,  “ [s]
ince there are the feeble-minded, that is to say, individuals inaccessible to school discipline, schools for 
the feeble-minded will be created, and then schools for those who are inaccessible to schools for the 
feeble-minded ” ( 2006 , 54). 
  14 .  Foucault tells us in  The Order of Things that prior to the nineteenth century  “ life itself did not 
exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by 
 natural history ” ( Foucault, 1970 , 128). Natural historians had studied the physical structure of these be-
ings, their visible  “ characters. ” But at the turn of the nineteenth century, for the scientists who began to 
call themselves biologists, the object of study was, simply, life. Life was essentially a temporal process, 
unlike the characters so carefully delineated by natural historians. Life was dynamic; life was develop-
ment. The study of life was the study of change through time expressed as the shifting manifestations of 
organisms in their milieus. Without this concept, there could have been neither a developmental body 
nor a population. Population became a fundamental category in biological theory in the nineteenth cen-
tury once it was seen as the solution to the problem of how the milieu acts on the organism.  “ To think 
about the relationships between the milieu and the organism, Lamarck resorted to something like the idea 
of the organism being acted on directly and shaped by the milieu. Cuvier resorted to what appear to be 
more mythological things — like catastrophes, God’s creative acts, and so on — but which actually orga-
nized the fi eld of rationality much more carefully. ” But then came Darwin.  “ Darwin found that population 
was the medium between the milieu and the organism, with all the specifi c effects of population: muta-
tions, eliminations, and so forth ” ( 2007 , 78). The concept of population — foundational for nineteenth-
century techniques of government — also gave biology its modern shape. Population and the concept of 
life-as-development that undergirds it swept across and restructured dozens of other fi elds of knowledge 
through the nineteenth century. Foucault demonstrates their importance in political economy and philol-
ogy; we also see them in philosophy, history, anthropology, and psychiatry. Thus, it is no exaggeration 
to say that the most fundamental patterns of our thinking today are products of the emergence of 
biopower. 
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  15 .  For example, Lee Silver’s  Remaking Eden opens with a description of two happy lesbians cra-
dling their newborn child. See  Silver (1998 , 2). The promise that same-sex couples can produce children 
genetically related to both of them is ubiquitous in the literature. There are already children who have 
genetic material from two women (as well as at least one man). In May 2001, New Jersey’s Institute for 
Reproductive Medicine at Barnabas Medical Center acknowledged that at least two children, by then a 
year old, had been born as a result of techniques that combined the DNA of three adults. The leader of 
the scientifi c team, Jacques Cohen, denied that these children were genetically altered, asserting that use 
of mitochondrial DNA from a second female did not constitute genetic engineering (or, presumably, triple 
parentage). But scientists in Australia and elsewhere condemned the work. For a few more details, see 
 Sams (2001) and  Romei (2001) . 
  16 .  Some moves to create guidelines have already been made. In 2006, the National Institutes of 
Health awarded Case Western’s School of Law $773,000 to develop guidelines for the use of human sub-
jects in genetic enhancement research. Their grant application reads in part:  “ In the absence of guidelines 
that explicitly address the special issues of enhancement research, subjects could be exposed to risks that 
would be acceptable in the case of therapeutic research but unacceptable in the case of enhancement 
research. Moreover, the absence of explicit enhancement research policy is likely to drive this type of 
research into the realm of  ‘ underground ’ illicit or off-label use and self-experimentation, which could 
cause serious harm to research subjects and to society ” (See Maxwell J. Mehlman, 2006, NIH Grant Num-
ber 1R01HG003879-01). This NIH-funded project is a sign that human experimentation may well go for-
ward in the near future, the poor record in experiments with domesticated animals and our scant 
knowledge of the interactivity of multiple genes in the human genome notwithstanding. 
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